TORTS-RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-FAMOUS PERSONS RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Is DESCENDIBLE-THE NEED FOR A DURATIONAL LIMIT ON THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY-Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day &

Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
The evolution of mass communications technology in the twentieth century has given rise to a new and unexpected legal right: the
right of publicity. With the advent of immediate national and worldwide communication capabilities came the birth of high-priced, multimedia advertising and promotional campaigns. These campaigns
have often employed the already-familiar names and faces of sports
and entertainment figures to promote a product or service to the
public. As a result, the names and likenesses of celebrities have developed a commercial value of their own. The right of publicity arose to
protect the commercial value which attaches to the names or likenesses of celebrities.'
In recent years, a large number of cases have addressed the
subject of an individual's right of publicity. 2 Courts have paid a great
deal of attention to two issues in particular-first, whether a separate
and distinct right of publicity exists, either statutorily or at common
law, in the jurisdiction involved; and, second, the nature of that right.
Although most recent decisions have recognized the existence of the

Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129
(Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969); see infra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
2 See generally Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.)
(plaintiff planned to erect memorial statue of Elvis Presley in Memphis and sold statuettes of late
singer to raise necessary funds), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (assignee of late Elvis Presley's right of publicity sued
defendant poster manufacturer for infringement), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Hicks v.
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha Christie's heirs claimed defendants had violated their publicity rights by producing movie depicting fictional account of an
episode in late author's life); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(widows of Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, along with corporate assignee, alleged defendant's
assignments of Laurel and Hardy movie rights were invalid); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979) (nephew/heir of Rudolph
Valentino sued filmmaker for portrayal of fictional account of deceased actor's life); Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979) (heirs of Bela Lugosi
sued for unauthorized use of Lugosi's likeness in his role as Count Dracula).
For an overview of the right of publicity, see Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the
Portrayalof Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Media
Portrayals];Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibilityof the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial
Life After Death? 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Right of Publicity]; Comment,
Commercial Appropriation Of An Individual's Name, Photograph Or Likeness: A New Remedy
for Californians,3 PAc. L.J. 651 (1972).
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right, 3 two opposing views have emerged, resulting in a continuing
debate concerning its character. 4 One view holds that the right of
publicity protects a purely personal interest and must, by definition,
terminate upon the death of the celebrity whose name and likeness
were protected. 5 The opposing view maintains that the right protects
an individual's property interest in the commercial value of his or her
name and likeness, and, as a property right, is assignable and descendible to the celebrity's heirs.6 Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day
& Night Co. 7 illustrates the antipodal results which are possible when

the two divergent theories, personal right versus property right, are
applied to the same set of facts.
The rights of publicity which the two plaintiffs in this action,
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. and Susan Marx, widow of Adolph
("Harpo") Marx, may have acquired arose in a different manner in
the case of each of the three Marx Brothers involved in this action.8 On
October 2, 1976, nine months before he died, Julius ("Groucho")
Marx executed an agreement assigning to Groucho Marx Productions,
Inc. "all right, title and interest in the name, likeness and style of the
character Groucho, both as an individual and as a member of the

3 See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
1 See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813. 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
The majority opinion defined the right as personal. Id. at 825, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at
329. The concurring opinion, while expressly refusing to address the issue of the nature of the
right, implied a recognition of a property interest in the right of publicity. "Merely playing a role
under the foregoing circumstances creates no inheritable property right . . . absent a contract so
providing. . . . I do not suggest that an actor can never retain a proprietary interest in a
characterization. . . . Unquestionably an inheritable property right can be either created or
eliminated by contract." Id. at 826, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (Mosk, J., concurring). Chief Justice Bird, writing the dissenting opinion, clearly found the interest protected by
the right of publicity to be a property interest. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at 445, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 343
(Bird, C.J., dissenting); see also Media Portrayals,supra note 2, at 1593. "The most complex and
controversial example of the confusion resulting from the present state of the law involves the
extent to which the right of publicity is devisable." Id.
I Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
The court held that "the right to exploit name and likeness is personal to the artist and must be
exercised, if at all, by him during his lifetime." Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
6 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). The court reasoned that since the nature of the right of
publicity is purely commercial, '[t]here appears to be no logical reason to terminate this right
upon death of the person protected." Id. at 490.
7 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as G.M.P. II].
I Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Marx Brothers."" Groucho Marx Productions executed a similar agreement on June 13, 1979 with Leo ("Chico") Marx's widow, Mary Marx
Fusco, as representative of the estate of Chico Marx, who had died
eighteen years earlier.' 0 There had been no express devise of any such
publicity rights in the will of Chico Marx, but his widow claimed
these rights were included within the residuary estate of which she
was the beneficiary. I"No agreement of any kind existed regarding the
assignment of Harpo Marx's right of publicity, but Susan Marx,
named as the trustee of the residuary trust under the will of her late
2
husband, claimed standing.'
The plaintiffs charged, inter alia, that the Day & Night Co. and
Alexander Cohen '3 (Day & Night) appropriated their rights of publicity in the Marx Brothers' characters, specifically "in the names and
likenesses of Groucho, Harpo and Chico Marx." "4 The plaintiffs'
claims against Day & Night for usurpation of their asserted rights of
publicity arose out of the production by the defendants of the musical
play A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine.'5 The play opened
on Broadway on May 1, 1980.16 Described as a "spoof" and a "parody" by the producers 7 and as a "satiric comment on Hollywood
I

Id. at 486.

1o Id. The play A Day in Hollywood/A Night in the Ukraine, which is the subject matter of
this litigation, opened in England six months prior to the agreement executed between Groucho
Marx Productions, Inc. and Mary Marx Fusco. Id.
Id.
' Id. The defendants contended that Susan Marx's standing was an issue of fact to be
determined at trial since Harpo Marx's will did not expressly name Susan as testamentary trustee.
Id. at 492 n.8. The plaintiffs relied upon the judgment and "Final Distribution Under Will" of
the California Superior Court that names "Alva Marx, aka Susan Marx," as trustee of the
residual estate in her capacity as Harpo Marx's widow. The district court in New York rejected
the defendants' contention and accepted the judgment of the California court. Id.
13 Id. at 486. The Day & Night Co. and Alexander Cohen were producers of the play A Day
In Hollywood/A Night In The Ukraine, along with the Shubert Organization, against whom
plaintiffs' claims were resolved prior to the district court opinion. The authors of the play,
Richard K. Vosburgh and Frank Lazarus, were named as third-party defendants. Id.
'4 Id. The plaintiffs' amended complaint included a cause of action under the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), thereby invoking federal question jurisdiction, as well as diversity
jurisdiction. G.M.P. 11, 689 F.2d at 319. Neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed
the plaintiffs' Lanham Act assertions, but concentrated instead on the issues of the existence of a
right of publicity at common law and the conflicting definitions of the right in New York and
California. Id.; Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
" Id. The play had opened on January 10, 1979 in London, England and made subsequent
stops prior to its opening in New York almost a year and a half later. Id.
" Id. at 493. In support of their position, the defendants cited various critical reviews that
described the play in those terms. Id.
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movies" by co-author Richard Vosburgh,1 8 the second half of the play
consisted of the authors' idea of how the Marx Brothers might have
dramatically interpreted Chekhov's The Bear. 9 Although the Marx
Brothers' names were not actually used in the play, three principal
actors were instructed by the script to imitate both the style and
appearance of Groucho, Chico and Harpo Marx.2 0 The plaintiffs
claimed that this second half of the play violated their protected rights
2
of publicity. '
Initially, the plaintiffs sought summary judgment in District
Court for the Southern District of New York2 2 based upon their
alleged rights of publicity. 23 Their amended complaint requested
damages " 'in the nature of a license fee' "24 because of the defend25
ants' unauthorized appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters.
The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in each of
2
the plaintiffs' causes of action.

11

Id. In an affidavit, Vosburgh stated that his intention had been to use "a parody of the

Marx Brothers' movies as one of the literary devices." Id.
19 G.M.P. IL 689 F.2d at 318-19.
20 Id. at 319.
21 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
22 G.M.P. 11, 689 F.2d at 319.
23 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d'Cir. 1982). The district court recognized three distinct issues which had
to be addressed in order to determine whether the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
should be granted: "(1) whether New York recognizes a common law right of publicity; (2) if so,
whether such a right is descendible; and (3) whether the first amendment protection of entertainment limits the scope of the right of publicity as applied in this case." Id. (footnote omitted).
In finding that first amendment protections did not extend to the play in question, the court
distinguished between the literary devices of satire and parody and "entertainment that merely
imitates." Id. at 493. That distinction lay in the fact that both satire and parody make use of the
works or characteristic traits of another and add a creative element of their own "to create a
larger presentation." Id. Imitation, on the other hand, results in "commercial gain" to the
imitator who appropriated another's work "without contributing substantially to" it. Id. The
district court felt that the authors' "wholesale appropriation of the Marx Brothers characters"
constituted imitation which is not an entertainment form protected under the first amendment.
id. at 493-94.
24 G.M.P. II, 689 F.2d at 319.
25 Id.; Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
26 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). "Defendants" includes third-party defendants Vosburgh and
Lazarus. Id.
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The district court determined that New York law was applicable
to the claims asserted by the parties. 27 The court reasoned that, since
the alleged violation of the plaintiffs' publicity rights took place in
New York, New York was "the place of the wrong." 28 Also, the court
noted that New York was the site of the most substantial contacts
inasmuch as all of the defendants were New York residents, the play
had run longer in New York than anywhere else, and -the Marx
Brothers characters were created and fully developed in New York. 29
Prior New York and Second Circuit decisions had recognized the
existence of the right of publicity and had described it as a property
right, 30 thus allowing subsequent findings that the right of publicity is
both assignable and descendible. 31 The district court therefore found
each of the plaintiffs in possession of a protected interest and a valid
cause of action against Day & Night. 32 Accordingly, the court granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and reserved decision
on the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment pending a
subsequent pretrial hearing on that matter. 33 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, found error in the district court's reliance
upon New York law as controlling in the instant case. 34 The court

21

Id.

at 487 n.1.

2s Id. The court relied upon the New York Court of Appeals opinion in Cousins v. Instru-

ment Flyers, Inc., 44 N.Y.2d 698, 376 N.E.2d 914 (1978), to find that New York courts would
apply the lex loci rule in tort litigation. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F.
Supp. 485, 487 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
29 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 n.l (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
30 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.) (first
recognizing "right of publicity" separate and distinct from right to privacy), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 816 (1953); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (characterizing the right of publicity as a property right with a "purely commercial nature").
" Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Agatha Christie
had "exploited" her right of publicity during her own lifetime, therefore, the valuable right
descended to her heir); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(stating that there was -no logical reason" to believe that right of publicity terminated with
death of protected individual).
32 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). The court relied specifically on the prior decisions in Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979);
Haelan Labs. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
816 (1953), and Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Groucho
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 488-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689
F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
31Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
3NG.M.P. II, 689 F.2d at 318.
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determined that California law was applicable to the facts in question,3 5 reversed the district court's ruling, and remanded the matter
36
for a new trial on any unresolved issues.
Generally the right of publicity protects a public figure's right to
the "financial benefit" derived from the "pecuniary value which attaches to" his name and likeness.3 7 This value is common among
"athletes and entertainers," '3

as evidenced by the number of sports

and other well-known media figures employed by manufacturers to
promote such diverse products as yogurt, beer, cosmetics, automo39
biles, toys and games, and home video equipment.
Prosser included the violation of a right similar to the right of
publicity among the four different "privacy invasions" with which he
delineated the limits of the right to privacy. 40 Prosser labeled the
particular invasion "appropriation" and described it as the unauthorized use of a person's name or likeness by another for that other
person's benefit. 4' By including appropriation in his "complex of four"

35

Id.

Id. at 323.
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129
(Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd mem., 32 A.D.2d 892, 301 N.Y.S.2d 948 (App. Div. 1969). Rosemont
involved an action brought against Random House, Inc. for its publication of an unauthorized
biography of Howard Hughes. The plaintiff, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc., was a corporation
formed by Hughes' close associates, apparently to prevent publication of the Random House
book. Rosemont claimed to own exclusive rights to Hughes' life story by virtue of an agreement
with Hughes whereby he assigned his right of publicity to plaintiff. Rosemont alleged that
publication of the Random House biography would "interfere with and infringe upon the
valuable rights plaintiff acquired under its agreement with Hughes .
Id. at 3, 294 N.Y.S.2d
at 126.
ld. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129. The right of publicity 'is a right that recognizes the
I1
pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures, particularly athletes
and entertainers.
...
Id., see also Media Portrayals, supra note 2, at 1588. The authors
recognized that many of the claims against unauthorized media portrayals have been asserted by
"professional performers .. .such as actors or athletes." Id.
" See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
Chief Justice Bird, dissenting in Lugosi, found it currently common practice and "big business"
for prominent athletes, entertainers and business people to sell their "persona[el'" to promote
commercial products. Id. at 834, 603 P.2d at 437-38, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
36
17

o W. PROSSER,

HANDBOOK

OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971), 802-13.

I' at 804. Prosser also pointed out that the invasion he labeled "appropriation" was the
Id.
first of the privacy invasions to receive judicial recognition in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box
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torts comprising the law of privacy, 42 Prosser characterized the right
to be protected from appropriation as a personal right, "the right of
the plaintiff 'to be let alone.'
He strengthened this characterization
by identifying as the common feature of the four privacy invasions the
",43

Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), where, despite a four-to-three decision which denied the
existence of the right, a "vigorous dissent" and subsequent "storm of public disapproval" led to
the enactment by the New York Legislature of a statute prohibiting the unauthorized use of any
person's name or picture for " 'advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade.' " L. 1903, c.
132, 1903 N.Y. Laws §§ 1-2, amended by N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976). W.
PRossEa, supra note 40, at 803-05; see Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). It is
extremely important to note that the violation which Prosser termed "appropriation" is not the
same as the violation of the right of publicity as it has been defined by the courts which have
recognized it. Prosser cited as examples of appropriation several incidents involving the fraudulent use of one's identity by some other person for that person's own benefit, e.g., impersonation
"to obtain credit or secret information." Id. at 403. This type of impersonation is obviously of a
very different nature from the commercial appropriation of a celebrity's persona to promote a
product. In the latter instance, the use of the pirated persona is due to, and evidence of, the
independent pecuniary value of that commercial entity which is the famous name or face.
41 W. PRoss :, supra note 40, at 804. "As it has appeared in the cases thus far decided,
[invasion of privacy] is not one tort, but a complex of four . . . distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff .... " Id. The other three privacy invasions are: intrusion, an
invasion of a person's "physical solitude or seclusion," id. at 807; disclosure, an offensive public
disclosure of private factors, id. at 809; and, false light, objectionable public exposure that falsely
portrays a person, id. at 812.
41 Id. A majority of recent analyzers of the right disagree, emphasizing the essentially
economic nature of the harm. See Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1125. "[P]ublicity rights
protect the individual's ability to profit from public exposure ... this right is more commercial
in its nature .... ." Id. at 1128; see also Note, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the Right
of Publicity, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (1978). The author stated that many courts have incorrectly
applied "the general rule that the right of privacy is personal" in cases where the plaintiff's
"publicity interest [is) in the pecuniary value of his or her name and likeness." Id. at 752. This
confusion, he went on to explain, is rooted in the courts' failure to distinguish between a cause of
action based on injury to one's feelings and one based on an appropriation of pecuniary value.
Id.; cj. Comment, supra note 2. In 1971, the California Legislature provided a statutory
remedy, through enactment of CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1983), for an individual whose
publicity rights had been violated. Comment, supra note 2, at 651.
The statute may be interpreted by the courts to confer a property right on every
individual in California in their personal identity. In other words, each person may
have a "right of publicity" in their name, photograph or likeness and any infringement of this right entitles the person to a minimum of $300 in damages. . . . The
Legislature arguably wanted to provide every person with a property interest of at
least $300 in his identity in order to protect him from the intentional, commercial
use of his identity.
Id. at 669. The need for such a remedy is predicated especially upon the fact that a celebrity's
"picture has a 'commercial value' attached and that he, as a 'public figure,' has been exploited
without sharing in the profits" when that picture is used by someone else for an unauthorized
commercial purpose. Id. at 657.
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fact that the right involved in each "is a personal one" which "is not
assignable." 44 Nevertheless, he pointed out that the interest that is
protected from appropriation is an exclusive "proprietary" right upon
45
which the individual can "capitalize by selling licenses."A distinct right of publicity was first recognized by an American4
court in Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ,
more than fifty years after the birth of the right to privacy. 47 Haelan
involved the question of whether a chewing gum manufacturer who
had contracted with a baseball player for the exclusive right to use the
player's photograph on baseball cards to promote gum sales had re-

44 W. PRossERs, supra note 40, at 814-15. Prosser obviously focused on the assignment of the
right to one's heirs, because he pointed out that no cause of action existed at common law for a
publication about a person who was already dead. Id. at 815.
11 Id. at 807. Prosser first used the term "right of publicity" when he cited Haelan Labs., Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), as
authority for an individual's right to enjoin an unauthorized, unlicensed third party from using
his name and likeness. W. PRossEH, supra note 40, at 807 n.50.
"B202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
41 In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis coauthored an article entitled The Right To
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), wherein they traced a development of the common law
remedies for trespass through the gradual broadening of the common law concepts to the
individual's "right to enjoy life." Id. at 193. Warren and Brandeis proposed that "[r]ecent
inventions and business methods" necessitated an expansion in American law of the "protection
of the person" to protection of "[t]houghts, emotions, and sensations," id. at 195, which they
termed the "right to privacy." Id. at 196. The authors suggested two appropriate remedies for a
violation of the right: "1. An action of tort for damages in all cases ....
[s]ubstantial compensation could be allowed for injury to feelings . . . "; and, "2. An injunction, in perhaps a very
limited class of cases." Id. at 219. It is ironic, considering the confusion which was created by the
later distinctions made between privacy and publicity, that the focus of the Warren and Brandeis
argument was that a cause of action for violation of the right to privacy must be legally
recognized especially in order to protect individuals from intrusions into their "private and
domestic li[ves]" by unauthorized reproductions of their photographs by the press.
A majority of states recognized the right as part of their common law in the years following
the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article. Media Portrayals,supra note 2, at 1581. The
first privacy statute was enacted by the New York Legislature by L. 1903, C. 132, 1903 N.Y.
Laws §§ 1-2, amended by N.Y. Civ. RIcHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976), in response to the
state court's refusal to recognize a common law right to privacy in Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538. 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (defendant used a young woman's picture, without
her consent, to advertise its flour).
The first judicial recognition of the distinct right of privacy that had been statutorily
recognized by the New York Legislature occurred when the Supreme Court of Georgia looked to
that statute and adopted the reasoning of Warren and Brandeis to decide Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (defendant used plaintiff's name and
picture in its advertisements, as well as fictional testimonial falsely credited to plaintiff), see also
Comment, supra note 2, at 651.
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ceived thereby a protectable property interest. 48 The court found that
"in addition to and independent of th[e] right of privacy .
, a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . . .This right
might be called a 'right of publicity.' "" The court, however, refused
to affix the "property" label to that right on the ground that it was
"immaterial" here since "the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact
that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth." 50
Since Haelan, the right of publicity has been judicially recog51
nized in a number of the nation's major commercial jurisdictions.
Although the right has been generally defined by the courts and
commentators addressing the subject as a person's exclusive right to
the use of his name and/or likeness for commercial purposes,5 2 there
has not been universal agreement as to the body of law to which the
right of publicity belongs nor to the manner in which the right arises.
In Cepeda v. Swift & Co.,53 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
not only recognized the existence of a well-known sports figure's right
of publicity, but also defined the nature of that right by asserting
"that plaintiff has a valuable property right in his name, photograph
and image and that he may sell these property rights. ' 54 Thus, in
unequivocal terms, the Eighth Circuit deemed the right of publicity to
be an assignable property right.

11Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 867. Plaintiff's cause of action in Haelan was inducing a breach
of contract. Id. at 868. The defendant argued that a right of privacy is the only legal interest one
has in his photograph. Since that right is "personal and non-assignable," continued the argument, plaintiff's contracts only protected plaintiff from liability for any invasion of a privacy
right. The court rejected this argument, and in so doing, declared its belief that the "right in the
publicity value of [one's] photograph" is "independent" of New York's statutory right to privacy.
Id.
" Id. This quoted passage contains the first judicial use of the term "right of publicity."
50 Id.; see also Note, supra note 43, at 757.
-" Media Portrayals,supra note 2, at 1589 n. 67.
52 Id. at 1589; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
-3 425 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969). Cepeda involved a professional baseball player's assignment to a sporting goods manufacturer of the right to use his name, signature or likeness in
connection with the sale of baseball equipment. Id. at 1206. By the assignment agreement, the
manufacturer also acquired the right to license others to make the same use of the player's name
and/or likeness. Id. In 1967, the sporting goods manufacturer entered into an agreement with
Swift and Company, a meat processor, to sell baseballs to Swift to be used in a promotional
campaign. In addition, the manufacturer agreed to allow Swift to use the plaintiff's name and
likeness in Swift's advertising campaign. Id. Plaintiff alleged that his right of publicity had been
infringed upon by this unauthorized use of his name and likeness. Id. at 1205. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found for the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiff's assignment to
the sporting goods manufacturer had included the authorization for subsequent licensing agreements executed by the manufacturer with third parties. Id. at 1207-08.
51 Id. at 1206.

1983]

NOTE

The United States Supreme Court, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 55 recognized and upheld the State of Ohio's
common law right of publicity5 6 Since Zacchini involved the broadcasting of the plaintiff's entire "human cannonball" act on a local
television news program, the case presented a direct confrontation
between first amendment freedoms of expression and of the press and
an individual's publicity right. 57 The Court likened the underlying
legal philosophy of the right of publicity to that of patent and copyright law.5 8 These areas of law have a common purpose in that each
extends a protection designed to encourage individual creative effort
by providing an "economic incentive" for the individual celebrity,
inventor, or artist.59
Between 1975 and 1978 the District Court for the Southern District of New York published several decisions characterizing the right
of publicity as a property right. In Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. ,60 former
boxing champion Muhammad Ali sued a national magazine because
of its unauthorized publication of an offensive portrait of Ali. The
court distinguished between New York's "common law property right
of publicity""' and the statutory right to privacy under section 51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law . 2 In its analysis, the court emphasized that the "distinctive aspect" of the right of publicity is the
recognition of "the commercial value of the picture or representation
of a prominent person, '6 3 and borrowed the terminology of trademarks to find a publicity right "analogous to a commercial entity's
right to profit from the 'goodwill' it has built up in its name."' 64 The

- 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
56 Id. at 578.

7 Id. at 563-64.
51Id. at 573. The Court explained that the right of publicity, as well as the laws of patent
and copyright, protected an individual's right "to reap the reward of his endeavors." Id.
56 Id. at 576; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Although the fighter's name was not used the portrait,
which appeared in the February 1978 issue of Playgirl Magazine, was alleged to be "unmistakably recognizable as plaintiff Ali." Id. at 725.
6 Id. at 728. The Ali court found "[t]he distinctive aspect of the common law right of
publicity" to be "that it recognizes the commercial value of the picture or representation of a
prominent person or performer, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his
public reputation or 'persona.' " Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
84 Id.
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court then remarked that "the interest which underlies protecting the
right of publicity 'is the straightforward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of goodwill.' "65
In both Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 66 and Hicks v. Casablanca Records,6 7 the courts specifically addressed the issue of descendibility of the right of publicity. Price concluded that there is "no
logical reason to terminate this right upon death of the person protected. It is for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has
been deemed a 'property right.' "68 In addition, the court reasoned
that there was no attendant requirement that a celebrity exercise or
"exploit" his right of publicity in order to "preserve" the right for his
heirs.69 Hicks, on the other hand, while in agreement with Price as to
the fact of descendibility of the right, recognized the necessity of some
exploitation by the celebrity during his own lifetime as essential to its
descendible nature. 70 Exploitation was defined by the court as "act[ing] in such a way as to evidence [one's] own recognition of the

"I Id.

at 728-29.
F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The defendant corporation owned copyrights to several
films of deceased actors Stanley Laurel and Oliver Hardy. Id. at 838. Defendant also claimed to
be successor-in-interest to rights derived from certain employment contracts of the two actors.
Id. By virtue of those alleged rights defendant entered into a licensing agreement with a third
party, giving that party " 'exclusive merchandising rights' to the names and likenesses of Laurel
and Hardy." Id. Plaintiffs were the two widows and sole beneficiaries of Stanley Laurel and
Oliver Hardy, and a corporation-assignee of the exclusive right to merchandise the personae of
the two late comedians. Id.
" 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The plaintiffs were the heirs and the assignees of the
late mystery writer Agatha Christie. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a movie producer and a publisher
from distributing a movie and a book presenting a fictionalized depiction of a real incident in the
late author's life. The court recognized a valid right of publicity that descended to Christie's
daughter and to her assignees based upon the author's exploitation of the commercial value in her
own name during her lifetime. Id. at 428-29. Nevertheless, since both the book and the movie
were protected forms of entertainment under the first amendment, that consideration outweighed the plaintiffs' publicity rights and the motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.
Id. at 431, 433.
68 Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
69 Id. at 846. The court recognized that it would have been impossible for Laurel and Hardy
to lose their publicity rights in their own names and likenesses through " 'non-use,' " thus
precluding "any necessity to exercise the right of publicity during one's life in order to protect it
from use by others or to preserve any potential right of one's heirs." Id.
70 Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429. The court noted that a valid, transferable property' right in
one's publicity value survives only when the celebrity "exploits" the right while alive. Id. (citing
Factors Etc., Inc. v.Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 n.l (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979)).
66 400
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extrinsic commercial value of [one's] name or likeness, and manifest[ing] that recognition in some overt manner, e.g., making an inter
vivos transfer of the rights in the name ... ."171
In 1978 the Second Circuit delivered the first of two opinions in
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (Factors1),72 which involved an
assignment by Elvis Presley of his exclusive right "to print, publish
and distribute his name and likeness." 7 3 The court reasoned that the
identification of that exclusive right "as a transferable property right
compels the conclusion that the right survives Presley's death. 7 4 The
court relied on Price75 as to the issue of descendibility because no state
court had yet interpreted New York law concerning the right of
76
publicity.
Almost two years after Factors I, Factors Etc., Inc. was a party
to another appeal involving Elvis Presley's right of publicity in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc. 77 In Memphis
Development, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of inheritability of
the common law right of publicity as a question of first impression,
stating that no Tennessee court had yet addressed the issue "directly or
indirectly." 7 The court concluded that "the right of publicity should
not be given the status of a devisable right, even where . . . a person
exploits the right by contract during life." 7 The Sixth Circuit determined that "it seem[ed] fairer and more efficient" to allow the "name,
memory and image of the famous" to devolve to the public domain, to
80
be "open to all rather than to be monopolized by a few."
11 Id. The court found sufficient exploitation in that author Agatha Christie had "assigned
rights . . . and also bequeathed similar rights by testamentary disposition." Id.
12 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Factors

I].
fl Id. at 221.
'
Id. The court employed a trust analogy to explain that, after assigning a valid property
right to Boxcar Enterprises, Inc. during his lifetime, Presley became a "beneficiary of an income
interest in Boxcar's exclusive right." Id. The court reasoned that, upon his death, the income
interest that continued to be produced from the right of publicity should inure to Presley's estate.
Id.
71 Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844; see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
" Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 221. All previous decisions concerning the issue of descendibility of
publicity rights which had been decided by courts employing New York law had been either
federal district court or Second Circuit court opinions. See e.g., Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 866
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
FactorsI decision had preceded Hicks in emphasizing exploitation by the celebrity, himself, as a
key factor in determining the survivability of the right. Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 222.
77 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
7
Id. at 958.
79 Id.
10 Id. at 960.
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Meanwhile, the Factors I case had been retried in the Southern
District of New York,81 on remand from the Second Circuit, and in
1981 the Second Circuit decided the second appeal of Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. (FactorsII).82 The appellants raised the choice of
law question for the first time on appeal, arguing that the Sixth
Circuit decision in Memphis Development should control the issue of
descendibility of the right of publicity. 83 The Factors II court reexamined the significant contacts in the dispute 84 and accepted Memphis
Development as controlling,8 5 holding that Boxcar Enterprises, Inc.
retained no exclusive right of publicity after Presley's death.8
The California Supreme Court set forth its interpretation of the
common law right of publicity in 1979 in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures8 7 and its companion case, Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions.8 8 In Lugosi, where the widow and son of actor Bela Lugosi
sued the defendant over its promotional uses of the image of Lugosi as
Dracula, the majority relied heavily upon Prosser's definition of the
law of privacy 8 to support its finding that the right of publicity is a
nondescendible, personal right. 0 The court reasoned that because the
right of publicity arose out of the personal right of appropriation," it
could only be asserted by the protected person whose privacy had
been invaded and thus, the right necessarily terminated upon the
death of the protected party.9 2 The Guglielmi court resolved a controversy over the portrayal of actor Rudolph Valentino in a television
movie produced by the defendant, but essentially limited its holding

81 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)

82 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
Factors II].
8 Id. at 280.
84 Id. at 280-81. The court particularly noted that the agreement under which Boxcar
assigned its rights to Factors Etc., Inc. expressly provided that it be construed according to
Tennessee law. Id. at 281.
11 Id. at 283.
86Id.
87 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
88 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
88 Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 603 P.2d at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27. Quoting W.
PnossEn, supra note 40, at 814-15, the court held that "the plaintiff's right is a personal one,
which does not extend to members of his family .... [T]here is no common law right of action
for a publication concerning one who is already dead." Id.
10 Id. at 819, 823 n.8, 603 P.2d at 428, 431 n.8, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 329 n.8.
"I Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (citing Prosser, supra note 41, at 389).
92 Id. at 821-22, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (quoting Hendrickson v. California
Newspapers, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 59, 62, 121 Cal. Rptr. 429, 431 (1975)).
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to the statement that "Lugosi controls the disposition" of a cause of
action based upon a theory of misappropriation of an inherited right
3
of publicity.
In 1981, when plaintiffs Groucho Marx Productions and Susan
Marx brought suit in federal district court 4 alleging violation by Day
and Night of their assigned and inherited exclusive rights of publicity
in the Marx Brothers characters, 5 the question of survival of the right
and descent of the right to one's heirs remained unsettled. New York
law, as applied by the district courts 96 and the Second Circuit,9 7
recognized and enforced a common law property right of publicity 8
which, if "exploited" by the celebrity during his lifetime, 99 descended
to his heirs.' 0 California law, on the other hand, recognized a right of
publicity that was personal in nature which, although assignable by
the celebrity during his lifetime, terminated upon the celebrity's
death. 10'
The Second Circuit, relying on the "substantial contacts" analysis
it employed in Factors 11,102 ruled in an interlocutory appeal that the
law of the State of California controlled the right of publicity issue in

Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
11 Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v.Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd,
689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981).
IId. at 486; see supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
9 See Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 426; Price, 400 F. Supp. at 836.
07 See Factors 11, 654 F.2d at 278; Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 215.
a See Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 221 (noting the characterization of the right of publicity as "a
valid transferable property right") (citations omitted)); Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429 (stating
unequivocally that "the right of publicity . ..is a valid property right"); Price, 400 F. Supp. at
844 (recognizing that a celebrity has "a property right in his name and likeness" during his
lifetime).
9 Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429 (quoting Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 222 n.11).
'o
Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
oi0
Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353; Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d
at 861, 603 P.2d at 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 353. By equating the right of publicity with a right to
privacy, California has defined the right of publicity as personal. G.M.P. II. 689 F.2d at 318.
101652 F.2d at 280-81. In Factors II, the substantial contacts of the parties in interest were
found to be greater in Tennessee than in New York. Both plaintiffs were incorporated in
Tennessee and all of the assignments and transfers were executed in that state. Most importantly,
the transfer agreement between Boxcar Enterprises and Factors Etc., Inc. contained an express
provision requiring construction according to Tennessee law. Id. at 281. The Second Circuit,
therefore, applied the law of Tennessee, as it had been interpreted by the Sixth Circuit in
Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 956, 957. Id. at 283. It accordingly ruled that Boxcar's
exclusive rights in Presley's image terminated upon his death. Thus, the transfer of those rights
two days after Presley's death to Factors Etc., Inc. was necessarily void. Id.
93
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10 3
Groucho Marx Productions.
That court reassessed the contacts of
the parties involved and concluded that those contacts were greater
104
with California.
In order to determine what California law required, the court
looked to the 1979 California Supreme Court decisions in Lugosi v.
05
Universal Pictures1
and Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Produc06
tions. These two cases established the California rule that the right
of publicity, being a protection of persona107 interests*, necessarily
terminated upon the death of the protected individual'"8 and thus,
could not descend to his or her heirs. The Second Circuit, applying the
Lugosi-Guglielmi reasoning to the facts in Groucho Marx Productions, found that California would not recognize any publicity rights
asserted by the plaintiffs after the Marx Brothers' deaths. 0 9 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of partial
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of infringement of their rights of publicity and remanded to the district court to
litigate the remaining issues in accordance with its findings." 0
The initial confusion which created the present schism between
jurisdictions such as California and others, like New York, arose from
an improper application by some courts of Prosser's characterization
of appropriation as one of four invasions of the right to privacy."' A
clear distinction between the right to privacy and the right of publicity lies in the interest that is protected under each of those rights.

G.M.P. 11, 689 F.2d at 319-20.
Id. at 320. The G.M.P. 11 court concluded that California law applied because plaintiff
Croucho Marx Productions was a California corporation and the agreement with Groucho
Marx, a California resident at the time, was executed in California. Id. Also, the court noted that
Groucho Marx Production's agreement with Chico's estate contained an express provision that
the contract be " 'made and entered in the State of California' " and was to be "governed by
California law." Id. Of additional importance was the fact that Susan Marx, a California
resident, asserted her interest in Harpo's right of publicity as the beneficiary of his residuary
estate under a will probated in California. Id. Further, the court noted that all three of the Marx
brothers were residents of California at the times of their deaths. Id.
10s 25 Cal. 3d at 803, 603 P.2d at 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
'06 25 Cal. 3d at 860, 603 P.2d at 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
"07Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
'08 Id. at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The court, quoting W. PaossEa, supra,
note 40, at 807, opined that "[sluch '... a right of value' to create a business, product or service
of value is embraced in the law of privacy and is protectable during one's lifetime but it does not
survive the death of Lugosi." Id.
109G.M.P. II, 689 F.2d at 320.
110 Id. at 323.
"ISee W. PRossEa, supra note 40, § 117, at 802; see also Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 603 P.2d
at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27; Note, supra note 40, at 752.
103

104
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Although the right of publicity, like the right to privacy, protects an
interest that "attaches" to the person, the similarity between the two
interests extends no further. The right to privacy is intended to protect
the individual's feelings and sensibilities against unwarranted attacks
upon his or her reputation or unauthorized and unwanted publication
of private information."12 Obviously, once the protected individual is
dead, his or her feelings can no longer be injured and protection is no
longer required. Therefore, the right is terminated upon the individual's death." 3
The right of publicity, on the other hand, protects an interest
that is purely pecuniary in nature.' 14 The protection extends to the
individual's ability to profit from the use of his or her name and
likeness. 1 5 It is the authorized publication of the name and likeness
which the individual may control through various licensing arrangements or assignments in order to maximize the potential for economic
gain." 6 When this protection is violated by an unauthorized use of
name or likeness, the resulting injury goes to the individual's purse,
not to his psyche. Through the right of publicity, an injured individual asserts his intangible property rights in his name and image in
order to protect their present and future commercial value. "17
It is apparent from the language used by the California Supreme
Court in Lugosi"18 and that used by Prosser 19 that even these personal
right advocates are compelled to define certain individual rights contained within the right of publicity and within the "bundle" of privacy rights in property law terms.120 Since Haelan, most courts that

1

Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 833, 603 P.2d at 437, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 335 (Bird, C.J. dissenting);

see also Note, supra note 43, at 752; Comment, supra note 2, at 655; see generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 40, at § 117.
"1 See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 958; Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 823 n.8, 603 P.2d
at 428, 431 n.8, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326, 329 n.8; Guglielmi, 25 Cal. 3d at 861, 603 P.2d at 455,
160 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
114 See Cepeda,415 F.2d at 1206-08; Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868; Ali, 447 F. Supp. at 728;
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
"s See supra note 37 and accompanying text,
11 Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868.
17 See Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 221; Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429.
ll See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 819, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. The Lugosi court
.""
Id. at 820, 603
reasoned that "the right to exploit one's name or likeness may be assignable..
P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327 (emphasis added). "The tie-up of one's name, face and/or
likeness with a business, product or service creates a tangible and saleable product in much the
same way as property may be created by one who . . . writes a book, paints a picture, or creates
an invention." Id. at 818, 603 P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (emphasis added).
"9 See W. PROSSER, supra note 40, § 117, at 807.
110See supra notes 118-19.
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have addressed the issue of publicity rights, and indeed every court
that has specifically addressed the question of survivability of the
12
right, have recognized that the right of publicity is assignable.'
Prosser explained that the existence of the right allows the protected
celebrity to grant ("sell") exclusive licenses to others for the commercial use of his or her likeness and name, and thus, to capitalize upon
that use. 122
A question remains, however, as to whether this valuable right is
23
an asset that becomes part of the celebrity's estate upon his death.1
This is the question which arose as the troublesome central issue in
Groucho Marx Productions, Inc. v. Day & Night Co. upon which the
district court 124 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 2 5 could not
agree.
The essential difference between publicity rights characterized as
personal rights and those characterized as property rights is the issue
of duration. A personal right is limited to the lifetime of the celebrity. 26 Thus, once the person protected by the right expires, so does
the personal right. Conversely, a property right would theoretically
descend for as long as a single heir exists to inherit the assets of the
estate,12 7 assuming, of course, there was no conflict with the rule

12 See Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 86 (recognizing publicity right, independent of New York's
statutory right to privacy, that included celebrity's "right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture"); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844 (explaining that courts and commentators
have been mindful of "'purely commercial nature" of right of publicity in recognizing it as
assignable); Factors 1, 579 F.2d at 220 (stating that right of publicity can be "validly transferred"); Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 429 (stating simply that right is transferable); Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at
823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (finding "[alssignment of the right.., synonymous
with its exercise"); see also G.M.P. II, 689 F.2d at 317; Factors II, 652 F.2d at 278, 284
(Mansfield, J., dissenting); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. at 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
122 W. PRossERs, supra note 40, at 807. It is illustrative of the confusion of terms, however, that
after expressly recognizing the ability to grant licenses, Prosser asserts that the protected right
involved in his four privacy-invasion torts is "not assignable." Id. at 815 (emphasis added).
I
Media Portrayals, supra note 2, at 1593.
24 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
125 689 F.2d at 317.
212 Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 603 P.2d at 430-31, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328-29.
121 See infra note 128; see also Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 823 n.8, 603 P.2d at 431 n.8, 160 Cal.
Rptr. at 329 n.8, where the California Supreme Court commented upon the problems associated
with the selection of "an appropriate durational limit" if the right of publicity were held to be
descendible. Id.
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against perpetuities. 2 8 It is this potentially eternal duration of the
right which has been addressed by some courts as the possible extreme
result of a property law definition of the right of publicity.1 29
It is improper that the right of publicity, where it is recognized at
all, is controlled by state law. The interest that is protected-the
commercial value of a celebrity's face and name, especially as it is
realized via national promotional campaigns-is inextricably intertwined with the federally regulated areas of interstate commerce and
broadcast communications. Thus, the area of publicity rights is one
that is ripe for federal regulation. Since the issue of the duration of the
right apparently presents the major obstacle to interstate uniformity
of definition, it seems likely that the need for agreement in this area
will lead the various state legislatures and courts, as well as Congress,
to look beyond the existing statutory and common law for some other
closely analagous area of law. If these respective bodies are to resolve
the right to publicity issue, they must look to a situation in which
30
similarly conflicting interests have been successfully resolved.

"28

See

BLACK'S LAW

DIC-riONARY 1195 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). By definition, the rule against

perpetuities would require that any property interest in his right of publicity which a celebrity
wished to bequeath to an heir or heirs living at the time of his death must vest in that heir or heirs
within 21 years after the "granting of [the] estate," id., i.e., within 21 years after his death.
129See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 328: May the remote
descendants of historic public figures obtain damages for the unauthorized commercial use of the
name or likeness of their distinguished ancestors? Id.
May the descendants of George Washington sue the Secretary of the Treasury for
placing his likeness on the dollar bill? May the descendants of Abraham Lincoln
obtain damages for the commercial exploitation of his name and likeness by the
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company or the Lincoln division of the Ford Motor
Company? May the descendants of James and Dolly Madison recover for the commercialization of Dolly Madison confections?
Id. at 827, 603 P.2d at 433, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 331 (Mosk, J.,concurring); see also Memphis Dev.
Found, 616 F.2d at 959:
How long would the "property" interest last? In perpetuity? . .. Does the right
cover posters or engraved likenesses of, for example, Farrah Fawcett Majors or
Mahatma Gandhi, kitchen utensils ("Revere Ware"), insurance ("John Hancock"),
electric utilities ("Edison"), a football stadium ("RFK"), a pastry ("Napoleon"), or
the innumerable urban subdivisions and apartment complexes named after famous
people?
Id.
I' The situation should be one in which there is some question about the nature and "ownership" of an intellectual property. One such example might be the conflict that arises between an
artist's personal right to privacy plus his right to exploit his own work for commercial gain as
opposed to the rights of others to profit from commercial uses of the artist's work.
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Several commentators1 3 ' and members of the judiciary 132 have
suggested that the courts and lawmakers look to the area of copyright
law as a guide in restructuring the statutory treatment of publicity
rights. Further, the United States Supreme Court recognized an identical purpose underlying the two protections of copyright and publicity right, 133 that being the provision of "an economic incentive for [the
artist or celebrity] to make the investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public." 13 It should be remembered
that the goals of copyright protection and the right of publicity both
center on the individual's right "to reap the reward of his endeavors."

135

An additional parallel may be drawn between the areas of copyright protection and the right of publicity. The creation and lifelong
development by the Marx Brothers of their three fictional characters
6
must certainly be recognized as the end product of an artistic effort 13
of no lesser magnitude than the creation of cartoon characters for
comic strips or of fictional characters in a play or novel. The printed
material, however, is subject to the protection of the Federal Copyright Act of 1976.137 Under that law the initial ownership of the
38
copyright vests automatically in the author of the protected work. 1
Right of Publicity, supra note 2, at 1129; Note, supra note 43.
Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 847, 603 P.2d at 446, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (Bird, C. J., dissenting).
Noting the similarity between the property interest protected by the right of publicity and that
protected by copyright, Chief Justice Bird suggested that the body of copyright law "is instructive." Id. Justice Mansfield recommended "analogy to the copyright statute" in placing limits on
the duration of the right of publicity. Factors 11, 652 F.2d at 287-88 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
'3
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
1 Id.; see also Media Portrayals,supra note 2, at 1601. "When the harm inflicted by a media
portrayal is essentially economic in nature, still another social policy applies: that of encouraging
individual achievement by allowing people to profit from their own efforts." Id.
'3
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
'3
See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 825, 603 P.2d at 432, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 330 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). Justice Mosk apparently viewed the Marx Brothers' development of their original
characters differently from an actor's portrayal of a fictional character that had been created by
someone other than the actor. He explained, "[ain original creation of a fictional figure played
exclusively by its creator may well be protectable. . . . Thus Groucho Marx just being Groucho
Marx, with his moustache, cigar, slouch and leer, cannot be exploited by others." Id. (citation
omitted).
13' The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. An additional irony arises with the
realization that the screenplays written for the movies in which the Marx Brothers' characters
appeared would undoubtedly have been copyrighted material. Although these screenplays could
not have been written but for the initial creative effort of the Marx Brothers, the authors of the
screenplays are assured of greater protection for their work than the Marx Brothers themselves
have received.
138 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(a) (1976). The copyright is unquestionably descendible. It may be
"bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession."
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
13
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NOTE

In order to bring an action for infringement of that copyright, the
owner thereof must register his copyright with the Copyright Office in
compliance with section 408 of the Copyright Act.1 3 Registration,
a copyright, is a
although not a requirement for the existence of
40
prerequisite for certain remedies under the Act.
The Second Circuit in Factors I,"4 the New York court in
Hicks,' 42 and the California court in Lugosi143 all discussed the necessity of exploitation of the right of publicity by the celebrity during his
lifetime in order for his heirs to assert a cause of action for infringement after his death. Both "registration" and "exploitation" manifest
the artist's or celebrity's recognition of the commercial value of his
creation and his intention to protect that value for himself and his
heirs.
The Copyright Act sets a durational limit on a copyrighted work
that is equal to the lifetime of its creator plus fifty years. 44 Were the
same type of limit to be applied to the right of publicity, the time
period should be long enough to protect the inherited rights of even
the youngest of the celebrity's immediate heirs, yet brief enough to
stifle the fears of those who have expressed concern about the possibility of lawsuits brought by distant descendants of famous celebrities.' 4
Although the copyright analogy has been stressed in dissenting
opinions in both the Second Circuit146 and the California Supreme
Court, 147 in the absence of legislative action, courts are unlikely to
apply the copyright analysis to the question of descendibility of the
right of publicity. Perhaps it is time for Congress to look closely at the
present confusion regarding publicity rights, and to provide the judici139 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1976). Subsection (b) lists the various materials which must be deposited
for registration at the Copyright Office; e.g., § 408(b)(1) "in the case of an unpublished work,
one complete copy or phonorecord." These materials must be accompanied by the required fee
and application form, as specified in § 708 and § 409, respectively.
140 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
14
579 F.2d at 222; see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
1 464 F. Supp. at 429; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
143 25 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 603 P.2d at 429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The court suggested that a
celebrity might establish a business "based upon publicity he received," id. at 820, 603 P.2d at
429, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327, or he might "tie-up" his name or face with an established business in
such a way as "to impress [that] business . . . with a secondary meaning.
... Id. at 818, 603
P.2d at 428, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326. Under such circumstances, the celebrity's heirs might inherit
that property, depending on how it had been managed during the celebrity's lifetime. Id.
44 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1976).
14s See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
41 See Factors II, 652 F.2d at 287-88 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
147 See Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 847, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45 (Bird, C. J.,
dissenting).
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ary with the statutory tool it needs to protect the intangible property
rights of the celebrity in his persona. The Federal Copyright Act of
1976 can serve as a guideline.
JeanneAnn McManus

